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Case NQ 20090454-CA 
3n 1111s iHtalj Court of Appeal* 
Tiffany F. Curtis, 
Petitioner and Appellee, 
-v-
\ HLV en Maese , 
Respondent and Appellant. 
h i ic-; ,.• \ ppe i j c i i 1 . , 
c < 
The Court of Appeal^ has jurisdiction over this matter under I tali Code Ann. 5 78A-4-
> i C E M E N T O F Tqc ,
 b 
laring that the lawyer-client relationship had completely broken don n, he could nut *"'-
fectively represent Mr. Maese. Therefore, Mr. Maese moved the trial court for a two 
wvvl i O I I I I I H M I U e lo ohl i im iii \\ io i i i i n '1 Should l L l i m l m il L e i -'I'linled Mi 
Maese's motion for continuance where his counsel declared ineffectiveness? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
The denial of a continuance to obtain counsel is evaluated under an abuse of discretion 
standard.1 Mr. Maese preserved this objection by mo\ wig tor a continuance.2 
1
 Layton Citu i\ I suwtrr ^ !\2d 655, 65L> Utah Ct. App. 1 997). 
POINT II. After declaring his inability to effectively represent his client, Mr. Maese's 
counsel moved the trial court to withdraw; the trial court granted the motion. Neither 
opposing counsel nor the trial court complied with Rule 74, which required a Notice to 
Appear or Appoint Counsel. Mr. Maese proceeded pro se. Where counsel declares his 
ineffectiveness, does Rule 74 allow a trial court to compel that litigant to proceed pro se? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUE 
The trial court's interpretation of the rules of civil procedure presents a question of law 
which is review for correctness.3 Mr. Maese preserved this issue in his Reply Memo-
randum in Support of his Motion for New Trial.4 Moreover, the trial court ruled on this 
point on the merits,5 resuscitating the issue if necessary.6 
RULES, STATUTES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
This Court's interpretation of the following rule and statute is important to the issues on 
appeal and their full texts are attached at ADDENDUM A: 
RULES 
• Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 74(c) (2009). 
STATUTES 
• Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (2008). 
3
 Migliore v. Migliore, 2008 UT App 208, U 10,186 P.3d 973. 
4
 R. at 319. 
s R. at 349 (Tr. 5:4-11, May 5,2009.). 
6
 See generally State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862,870 (Utah 1993). 
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C i L September 1 6 ?( )( I K - ' ': : :• , > . " ; i ffany Curtis — through 
the Salt Lake Legal Aid Societx - filed a Kequest for Civil Stalking Injunction against S. 
Steven Maese. 
s
 »>• •< • • "'' " • '1S. Mr. Maese was served with the ex parte Civil Stalking Injunc-
tion; :•.. o dav^ laier, he filed a Request for Hearing. 
I" lr I\ laese : - )ei iaed cioci lmei its fit: on 1.1\ Is Ci irtis; si: le retained pri\ ate coi :i::t: tsel 
and on December X 200K, filed a Motion le- Ouash. 
On March 6, 2oi ^  Uu- trials oun m •- .. - ,
 ; ientiary hearing on ti; - matte:. or. 
1\ lard 1.1 01 ""•:--v' s •• • *>• < r '-jp. lit civil stalking injunction and six days later en-
tered its findings oi fact and conclusions of law. 
the trial court held a hearing regarding the Motion lor \ e w Irial, whit b r denied 
: • • — • • • ' s 
As the evidentiary hearing began, Mr. Xiae^e s counsel declared: 
j
 a m a t a p0|n...(- | n l lK. ,.i v^eeuiiig iiitu ii die Court wanL, .. ,_v ,:iu ard \\\, 
our lawyer/client relationship has literally broken down to the point that 1 do 
not believe I can effectively and adequately represent Mr Maese in this matter, 
and I t h "^ -^  ^ e-uld agree with ihm.7 
Upon hearing this, Mr. Maese promptly moved the trial rourt for two week conti-
niidi iei1 Inn obtain i ii • w i ii 111< i« • I l in liiiiil in I i Iciiii/c 1 In -• „ ^ 
going to move forward. ^ ou can relieve Mr. Athay if you wish, but we're going to go 
7 k !' V>IA ( l r ; 2 1 1:1. Ma*- h ^ JlK>*- . 
forward today. I mean, this isn't a criminal trial/'9 Regarding this issue, the trial court 
did not enter any other findings of fact or conclusions of law.10 
* * * 
Ms. Curtis based her request for civil stalking injunction on the statutory minimum, two 
predict incidents.11 Neither incident involved direct interaction but both involved cars. 
In the first incident, Ms. Curtis procured a hotel room to prostitute herself.12 Mr. 
Maese circled the parking lot of the hotel and left immediately.13 Ms. Curtis testified 
that Mr. Maese never made any gestures towards her; he did not yell at her; he did not 
get out of his car; and he did not make any threatening moves whatsoever.14 
Mr. Maese testified that arrived at this hotel to confirm she was staying there and 
prostituting herself; that he was investigating her.15 This assertion was unrebutted. 
In the second incident, Mr. Maese followed her while she was driving on I-15.16 Ms. 
Curtis saw Mr. Maese's car in her rearview mirror; the car then drove up alongside her 
car on the left, then in front, then alongside the right, yet did not follow her when she 
exited the interstate.17 Although Ms. Curtis did not look at Mr. Maese18 she testified 
9 R. at 331A (Tr. 5:7-9, March 6, 2009.). 
10
 R. at 331A generally. 
11
 R. at 1-13. 
12
 R. at 331A (Tr. 36:5-23, March 6, 2009.). 
13
 R. at 331A (Tr. 21:6-10, March 6, 2009.). 
14
 R. at 331A (Tr. 37:5-13, March 6, 2009.). 
15
 R. at 331A (Tr. 49:9-11; 50:7-12, March 6, 2009.). 
16
 R. at 331A (Tr. 21:14-22:1, March 6, 2009.). 
17
 R. at 331A (Tr. 22:12-23:5, March 6, 2009.). 
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that he did not s"\ \ -er \ e, try to run her off tl: t.e road, or make any gestures ai r.a «he 
told a District Attorney's investigator that she thought Mr. Maese's wanted her to pull 
over so he could talk to her; she never expressed emotional distress or that she believed 
I" li !"\ laese \ \ 'anted to pi lysicall) 1: tax n 11 ler 2( :i" 
* * * 
(3i L at least three occasions, Mr. Maese requested continuances for the purpose of pre-
paring for trial, calling rebuttal witnesses, and gather ir. J-«-;<'nrnt.v:-\ /-:-i '.'••'••v.i : *1 
evidence.21 The Court denied each request.22 
* * * 
Based on the testimom o\ one witness, the trial court concluded that Mr. Maese had i \) 
committed rape, tJj committed assault, i •,< > oirun;iu .;
 4,* u distances of aggravated w ,t-
ness tampering; and (4) had stalked an individual by observing her admitted prostitu-
tion activities.23 
SUMMARY UI ; A R G U M E N T 
POINT I In Layton City v. Longcrier, the Utah Supreme Court established a five-part 
nuance to obtain counsel. Mr. Maese satisfies all five criteria and shows that if the court 
18
 R. at 331A (Tr. » :7 March h, 2()(W ). 
:
 • K at Til A (Tr ^-2-1 7, March 6. 2(W.) 
v \-\i \ • i * . . . , : • \ ; . . . •••, v 
- - 1 A ( | r




 R. at 284-288. 
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had granted his request, he would have proved that: (1) his conduct was constitutional-
ly protected from Utah's stalking statute; (2) Ms. Curtis never felt fear or emotional dis-
tress and that a reasonable person in her circumstances (a person on probation engaging 
in specifically prohibited and illegal conduct) could not have felt fear or distress under 
the conduct alleged; (3) Ms. Curtis has a severe credibility problem and repeatedly lied 
to those in authority over her to achieve her goals; and (4) Mr. Maese's version of events 
is corroborated by evidence. 
POINT II. Under Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and absent waiver, 
when counsel withdraws, opposing counsel must file a Notice to Appear or Appoint 
Counsel with the solitary litigant. Here, the trial court failed to comply with the Rule 
and justified this by holding that its ability to compel counsel to represent a litigant is 
the functional equivalent of requiring that litigant to proceed pro se. This is incorrect be-
cause due process required the trial court to grant Mr. Maese's counsel withdrawal. 
Moreover, Rule 74(c) fails to equate compelled representation with self-representation. 
A R G U M E N T 
POINT I. The trial court abused its discretion by denying Mr. Maese's motion for 
a continuance to obtain counsel. 
To establish that a trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance, Mr. Maese 
must show that its decision was "an unreasonable action/'24 which prejudiced him.25 In 
24
 Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309,311 (Utah. Ct. App. 1992). 
25
 Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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Layton City v. Longcrier, this court adopted a five-part test to determine if a trial court 
abused its discretion in denying a continuance requested to obtain counsel: 
1. whether other continuances have been requested and granted; 
2. the balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, coun-
sel, and the court; 
3. whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilato-
ry, purposeful, or contrived; 
4. whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the 
request for a continuance; and 
5. whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to a par-
ty's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is material or substantial in nature. 
Mr. Maese addresses each of these criteria in turn. 
A. Mr. Maese did not request prior continuances. 
The record shows that the litigants had stipulated to prior continuances. Yet Mr. Maese 
did not request prior continuances and the court did not grant any at his request. There-
fore, under Longcrier, "the first factor weighs in [Mr. Maese's] favor."26 
B. Inconvenience to litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court was absent. 
Here, Ms. Curtis was the only witness and litigant opposing Mr. Maese. She was a full-
time student.27 The record fails to show, nor did Ms. Curtis claim, any inconvenience by 
continuing the proceeding. 
Ms. Curtis however, enjoyed the full protection of the ex parte stalking injunction in 
place at the time. This protection would have perpetuated through any continuance. 
26
 Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
27
 R. at 331A (Tr. 57:24, March 6, 2009.). 
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Conversely, as discussed in SECTION E, continuing with trial inconvenienced Mr. Maese 
greatly. Therefore, "On balance, the second factor weighs in [Mr. Maese's] favor/'28 
C. Mr. Maese requested the continuance for a legitimate reason. 
At hearing, Mr. Maese's counsel spontaneously moved to withdraw from the case stat-
ing, "I think our lawyer/client relationship has literally broken down to the point that I 
do not believe I can effectively and adequately represent Mr. Maese in this matter../729 
Furthermore, Mr. Maese stated "a week or two weeks continuance is all that would 
be required on this."30 Moreover, Mr. Maese's counsel acknowledged that Mr. Maese 
had actually spoken with different counsel in order to retain them.31 The record shows 
that Mr. Maese's request was sincere and non-dilatory. 
D. Mr. Maese did not contribute to Mr. Athay's request to withdraw. 
The record shows that Mr. Maese did not contribute to the circumstance which gave 
rise to the request for a continuance. Mr. Maese's counsel refused to file a motion to 
compel discovery and a motion for continuance based on the Ms. Curtis's noncom-
pliance with the discovery order in place.32 Mr. Maese could not have foreseen that his 
requests would have compelled his counsel to spontaneously withdraw from his case. 
28
 Layton City v. Longcrier, 943 P.2d 655, 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
29
 R. at 331A (Tr. 3:22-25, March 6, 2009.). 
30
 R. at 331A (Tr. 4:9-10, March 6, 2009.). 
31
 R. at 331A (Tr. 4:11-26, March 6, 2009.). 
32
 R. at 331A (Tr. 6:13-15, March 6, 2009.); R. at 331A (Tr. 5:1-6, March 6, 2009.). 
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E. Mr. Maese was prejudiced by the denial of a continuance. 
In this case, Ms. Curtis's claims rested on civil stalking's statutory minimum number of 
predicate incidents: two. If Mr. Maese could have invalidated either incident, he would 
have prevailed. The lack of a continuance prevented this showing. 
Mr. Maese was prejudiced in multiple ways that, if addressed, would have resulted 
in a different verdict. Importantly, the State dismissed the criminal stalking charge.33 
Mr. Maese pled guilty to two counts of Attempted Violation of the Private Investigator 
Act, inchoate offenses; not part of Utah's Criminal Code. The State of Utah accepted the 
facts as Mr. Maese presented them: He did not stalk Ms. Curtis, he merely uncovered 
her illegal activities in furtherance of defending himself at trial. 
1. Mr. Maese had no witnesses on his behalf 
Had Mr. Maese been granted a continuance, he would have called three witnesses: A 
private investigator, a District Attorney investigator, and Ms. Curtis's probation officer. 
These witnesses would establish: that on at least one predicate incident, Mr. Maese 
acted in conjunction with a licensed private investigator to investigate Ms. Curtis; that 
incident produced actionable evidence; that Ms. Curtis never expressed fear for safety 
or emotional distress until after criminal charges were filed against Mr. Maese; and that 
Ms. Curtis repeatedly lied to those in authority over her regarding the conduct Mr. 
Maese uncovered. 
The private investigator would have established that at least one predicate incident 
related to legitimate investigation, not stalking. The investigator and Mr. Maese agreed 
33
 R. at 349 (Tr. 8:19-25, May 5, 2009.). 
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that Mr. Maese would identify which hotel Ms. Curtis was prostituting herself from and 
that the investigator would then surveil that location. 
The PI then would have testified that this is exactly what happened. That after Mr. 
Maese discovered her at a hotel and contacted the PI, the PI observed Ms. Curtis pro-
curing another hotel room approximately 60 blocks away. He would have also authen-
ticated video showing Ms. Curtis entering and leaving the hotel. 
Mr. Maese had submitted a hearing brief establishing his right to investigate wit-
nesses against him; the trial court did not exclude this theory as a legitimate defense. 
Next, the District Attorney investigator would have authenticated his police reports 
that showed Ms. Curtis never expressed fear or concern for safety or emotional distress 
of any kind when the incidents took place. He would have also established that her 
"distress" arose only after she was released from jail for violating her probation; a viola-
tion brought to light by Mr. Maese very real investigation. He would have also estab-
lished that in his experience as a police officer, criminals often feel distress about being 
caught committing crimes but that criminals are not "reasonable persons." 
Finally, Ms. Curtis's probation officer would have established that Ms. Curtis lied to 
him continually; she never admitted that she committed crimes until confronted with 
evidence that she did; after admitting to probation violations, she vowed to cease the il-
legal conduct, yet she had still not disclosed her most recent crimes. 
These witnesses would have established (1) a constitutionally protected exception to 
Utah's stalking statute; (2) Ms. Curtis never felt fear or distress and that a reasonable 
person in her circumstances (a person on probation engaging in specifically prohibited 
conduct) could not have felt fear or distress under the conduct alleged; and (3) Ms. Cur-
- 1 0 -
tis has a severe credibility problem and repeatedly lied to those in authority over her to 
achieve her goals. 
2. Mr. Maese was unable to enforce his discovery order. 
Stalking is predicated on the theory that the stalker knew or should have known his 
conduct would cause fear for one's safety or emotional distress.34 Mr. Maese theorized 
that in this case, where the litigants had previously enjoyed an amicable relationship, he 
needed to be notified in some way that any future contact, no matter how benign, 
would cause stress or be interpreted as intimidating. 
Ms. Curtis claimed that a defining event in July of 2007 should have put Mr. Maese 
on notice that any future contact from him was unwanted. 
Yet if Ms. Curtis had complied with the trial court's discovery order, the records 
would have shown that Ms. Curtis initiated contact on many occasions after July 2007; 
that in September 2007 she told him about her sexual exploits as a prostitute; that in De-
cember 2007 she asked Mr. Maese for money; that in January 2008 she sent him updates 
on people they knew. Given these facts, Mr. Maese could not have known that all con-
tact from him would be interpreted as hostile. 
These records would have negated the "knew or should have known" element in 
stalking, resulting a favorable verdict for Mr. Maese. 
3. Mr. Maese was ill-prepared to defend himself pro se. 
Ms. Curtis previously asserted that Mr. Maese is fully capable of representing himself 
because he "filed a number of briefs that were, for a pro se litigant, pretty well done."35 
34
 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5(2) (2008). 
35
 R. at 349 (Tr. 12:12-13, May 5, 2009.). 
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Yet later in that same monologue, Ms. Curtis states "I mean, he cited the law, he had his 
citations right, maybe he was getting some assistance/'36 
In any event, a trial attorney's skill set differs greatly from the skill set required to 
write a brief: literacy and logic. Trials, by nature, are fact intensive; a trial's purpose is to 
evoke facts. This is a skill set that Mr. Maese is without. 
Moreover, having been incarcerated and showing up in shackles,37 Mr. Maese could 
not have prepared an adequate cross examination on such short notice. Additionally, 
without the power to subpoena witnesses, Mr. Maese was at his counsel's mercy re-
garding case preparation. 
* * * 
Mr. Maese satisfies all five prongs of the Longcrier test. Demonstrably, the denial of his 
request for a continuance prejudiced the outcome of the evidentiary hearing. With a 
continuance, he could have adequately defended against the allegations, resulting in a 
favorable verdict. 
POINT II. The judgment against Mr. Maese is invalid because the evidentiary 
hearing violated Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in relevant part: 
If an attorney withdraws... the opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or 
Appoint Counsel on the unrepresented party, informing the party of the respon-
sibility to appear personally or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear 
or Appoint Counsel must be filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be 
36
 R. at 349 (Tr. 12:13-14, May 5, 2009.). 
37
 R. at 349 (Tr. 16:10-11, May 5, 2009.). 
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held in the case until 20 days after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Coun-
sel... 38 
When a Court violates this rule, its judgment must be vacated. In Loporto v. Hoege-
mann, the Utah Court of Appeals interpreted Utah Code Jud. Admin. R4 —506, Rule 74's 
predecessor. Quoted at length, their interpretation reads: 
Our reading of Rule 4 — 506's plain language compels the conclusion that the trial 
court erred by continuing with the proceedings after granting [Defendant's 
counsel's] motion to withdraw.... When [Defendant's counsel] moved to with-
draw from the case, the trial court had two options: (1) deny [Defendant's coun-
sel] motion to withdraw and proceed with the trial; or (2) grant the motion to 
withdraw but stay any further proceedings until the requirements of Rule 4 —506 
were fulfilled...39 
In this case, the trial court allowed Mr. Maese's counsel to withdraw yet failed to com-
mand that Ms. Curtis comply with the Rule. The trial court held that its actions were 
consistent with the Rule; its inherent ability to require counsel to represent a litigant is 
the functional equivalent of requiring that litigant to proceed pro se. Moreover, it 
claimed its interpretation is further validated because it deferred the choice of attorney 
representation or self-representation to Mr. Maese.40 
Yet the options the trial court presented to Mr. Maese represent a classic Morton's 
Fork: Proceed with counsel who has declared his ineffectiveness or proceed alone. This 
choice is inherently prejudicial and under Utah law, is a false dichotomy. 
38
 Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c) (2009). 
39
 Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT175,113, 982 P.2d 586. 
40
 R. at 349 (Tr. 5:4-11, May 5, 2009.). 
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A. Where counsel declares a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, Due 
Process required that the trial court grant Mr. Maese's counsel's motion to 
withdraw. 
In State v. Lovell, the Utah Supreme Court stated that "It is well established that to war-
rant substitution of counsel, a [litigant] 'must show good cause, such as a conflict of in-
terest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict which 
leads to an apparently unjust verdict/ "41 
This issue is fundamentally a Due Process argument under both the Federal and 
Utah Constitutions. In Pangea Techs., Inc. v. Internet Promos, Inc., the Utah Supreme 
Court held, "We long ago succinctly summarized the fundamental features of due 
process, observing that it requires that notice be given to the person whose rights are to 
be affected. It hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment 
only after trial."42 And in Chen v. Stewart it held that "The bare essentials of due process 
thus mandate... an opportunity for [litigants] to be heard in a meaningful manner."43 
In this case, at trial, Mr. Maese's counsel told the Court that he was unable to pro-
ceed, stating ".. .1 think our lawyer/client relationship has literally broken down to the 
point that I do not believe I can effectively and adequately represent Mr. Maese in this 
matter..."44 After Mr. Maese's counsel made this declaration in open court, Mr. Maese 
could not reasonably be expected to employ his counsel's services. 
41
 State v. Lovell, 1999 UT 40, f 31, 984 P.2d 382. 
42
 Pangea Techs., Inc. v. Internet Promotions, Inc., 2004 UT 40, | 8, 94 P.3d 257 (internal qu-
otation marks omitted). 
43
 Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, | 68,100 P.3d 1177. 
44
 R. at 331A (Tr. 3:15-4:5, March 6, 2009.). 
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By proclaiming his inability to represent Mr. Maese in this matter, his counsel told 
the trial court he could not advocate on behalf of Mr. Maese in a meaningful manner. 
Moreover, the language characterizing his position is almost identical to that expressed 
in State v. Lovell. Due process required the trial court to grant his counsel's motion. 
B. Rule 74(c)'s plain language does not permit a trial court to compel a litigant 
to proceed pro se. 
Noticeably absent from Rule 74(c) is an option to force a litigant to proceed pro se. While 
the Rule permits waiver,45 the trial court did not use waiver as the basis for it ruling. 
Furthermore, by addressing the merits of the Rule 74(c) argument at a Motion for New 
Trial hearing, the trial court effectively "resuscitated" the issue had it been waived.46 
Yet absent waiver, its holding in Loporto v. Hoegemann stands and "compels opposing 
counsel to file a required notice and also directs the trial court to wait twenty days after 
that filing before holding further proceedings."47 
Rule 74(c) does not permit trial courts to compel litigants to represent themselves. A 
holding to the contrary guts the plain language and intent of Rule 74; that litigants must 
decide whether to represent themselves or retain attorney representation. 
* * * 
In this case, the trial court failed to comply with Rule 74(c). Subsequently, it crafted a 
post hoc rationalization that is unsupported by the Rule's plain language. Accordingly, 
the trial court's judgment in this matter is invalid because it violated the Rule. 
45
 Migliore v. Migliore, 2008 UT App 208,186 P.3d 973, (interpreting Rule 74(c)'s waiver 
provision.). 
46
 See generally State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 870 (Utah 1993). 
47
 Loporto v. Hoegemann, 1999 UT 175, f 14, 982 P.2d 586. 
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CONCLUSION 
WHEREFORE, Mr. Maese respectfully requests this Court reverse the trial court's entry of 
judgment and permit Mr. Maese time to retain new counsel. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this 17th day of November, 2009. 
S. Steven Maese 
Appellant Pro Se 
CERTIFICATE of SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 17th day of November, 2009, two true and correct copies of 
the foregoing were served by the method indicated below, and addressed to: 
Rebecca C. Hyde Q Ha»d Delivery 
Skordas, Caston & Hyde, LLC 0 t j S . Mail 
341 South Main St., Suite 303 • Overnight Mail 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
rhyde@schhlaw.com 
(801) 531-7444 p 
(801) 531-8885 f 
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Addendum A 
RULE 74 WITHDRAWAL OF COUNSEL. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(a) An attorney may withdraw from the case by filing with the court and serving on 
all parties a notice of withdrawal. The notice of withdrawal shall include the address 
of the attorney's client and a statement that no motion is pending and no hearing or 
trial has been set. If a motion is pending or a hearing or trial has been set, an 
attorney may not withdraw except upon motion and order of the court. The motion 
to withdraw shall describe the nature of any pending motion and the date and 
purpose of any scheduled hearing or trial. 
(b) An attorney who has entered a limited appearance under Rule 75 shall withdraw 
from the case by filing and serving a notice of withdrawal upon the conclusion of 
the purpose or proceeding identified in the Notice of Limited Appearance. An 
attorney who seeks to withdraw before the conclusion of the purpose or proceeding 
shall proceed under subdivision (a). 
(c) If an attorney withdraws other than under subdivision (b), dies, is suspended 
from the practice of law, is disbarred, or is removed from the case by the court, the 
opposing party shall serve a Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the 
unrepresented party, informing the party of the responsibility to appear personally 
or appoint counsel. A copy of the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel must be 
filed with the court. No further proceedings shall be held in the case until 20 days 
after filing the Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel unless the unrepresented party 
waives the time requirement or unless otherwise ordered by the court. 
(d) Substitution of counsel. An attorney may replace the counsel of record by filing 
and serving a notice of substitution of counsel signed by former counsel, new 
counsel and the client. Court approval is not required if new counsel certifies in the 
notice of substitution that counsel will comply with the existing hearing schedule 
and deadlines. 
76-5-106.5. STALKING—DEFINITIONS—INJUNCTION—PENALTIES. 
Title 76-Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 10 —Offenses Offenses Against the Person 
Section 1301 — Stalking — Definitions — Injunction — Penalties. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" means: 
(i) verdict or conviction; 
(ii) a plea cf guilty or guilty and mentally ill; 
(iii) a plea of no contest; or 
(iv) the acceptance by the court of a plea in abeyance. 
(b) "Course of conduct" means two or more acts directed at or toward a specific 
person, including: 
(i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs, surveils, 
threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or interferes with a 
person's property: 
(A) directly, indirectly, or through any third party; and 
(B) by any action, method, device, or means; or 
(ii) when the actor engages in any of the following acts or causes someone 
else to engage in any of these acts: 
(A) approaches or confronts a person; 
(B) appears at the person's workplace or contacts the person's employer 
or coworkers; 
(C) appears at a person's residence or contacts a person's neighbors, or 
enters property owned, leased, or occupied by a person; 
(D) sends material by any means to the person or for the purpose of 
obtaining or disseminating information about or communicating 
with the person to a member of the person's family or household, 
i_r< f'\ c \j -^ .. 
Civil Stalking Injunction 
Petitioner (person who asked for the stalking injunction): 
TT-femu IveweV^ Out+i^ 
By. 
Case Number: 
Court: ^ i V d J ^ i S & d i ^ b 
County: ^Sa lA- I ^ V ^ . State: Utah 
Cierk 
F/rsf O AfK/d/e Last 
Address and phone # (to keep private, leave blank): 
Sfreef Z T 
Other people protected by this order: 




Petit/oner's attorney (if any): j ^ b ^ 
Name \ Phone# 
Respondent (person who must obey this stalking injunction): ^es^l^e.^n^e.n^. 
Scuftb a £0. Stevm Middle Mftfrsfv Lasf First 
Other names used; 
Mdress:H^^^U^^Od^3Q3M^r 
C/Yy State Zip 










I S O 
Social Security # 
(only the last 4 numbers) 
Distinguishing features(like scars, tattoos, limp, etc.) 
Driver's license issued by (State): Expires: 
Best time and place to find Respondent: 
(Time): (Place): 
There was a hearing on (date): The Respondent was given notice and an opportunity to be heard in 
the hearing that gave rise to this order. The following people were present at the hearing: 
EkPetitioner (SPetitioner's attorney (name): *feOotjrj&jX \\~. S V - D V - d ^ S 
[^Respondent • Respondent's attorney (name): 
• Other (name) 
The court reviewed the Request for Civil Stalking Injunction and: • received argument and evidence, • accepted the 
stipulation of the parties, • entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear, finds that there is reason to believe that 
stalking has occurred and that the Respondent is the stalker, and makes the orders below. (Utah Code §77-3a-101) 
The court orders the Respondent to obey all orders initialed 
on this form. 
(The court fills out below.) 
jQ You must not contact or stalk the Petitioner. This order ends in 3 years on: ftWch U ±D\1-
Month Day Yer Warnings to the Respondent: 
• Attention: This is an official court order. No one except the court can change it. If you disobey this order, the court 
may find you in contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other crime you 
may have committed in disobeying this order. 
• This order is valid in all U.S. states and territories, the District of Columbia, and tribal lands. If you go to 
another U.S. state, territory or tribal land to violate this order, a federal judge can send you to prison. 
• No guns or firearms! It is a federal crime for you to have, possess, transport, ship, or receive any firearm or 
ammunition, including hunting weapons, while this civil stalking injunction is in effect. 
Civil Stalking Injunction 
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C §§2265, 2262, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) 
1 of 2 Approved by Board of District Court Judges, May 2006 
The Respondent must obey all orders initialed by the judicial officer. These orders replace any 
previous temporary stalking injunction in this case. Violation of these orders is a criminal Class A Misdemeanor, 
punishable by up to one year in jail and a fine. A second or subsequent violation can result in more severe penalties. 
1 A 
A 
Personal Conduct Order 
Do not stalk the Petitioner. This means you must not follow, threaten, annoy, harass, or cause distress to 
the Petitioner. For a legal definition of stalking, see Utah Code, sections 77-3a-106.5 and 77-3a-101. 
No Contact Order 
Do not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, or communicate in any way with the Petitioner and any person 
listed below, either directly or indirectly. 
Other people you must not contact: 
X Stay Away Order 
Stay away from: 
0 a. The Petitioner's current or future: 0 Vehicle • Job 0 School 0 Home, premises and 
property (list current addresses below) 
Home address: _QjW tft&dt ftj£ Sf£chr\^ 
Work address: _.. 
^ -
School address: j ^ ^ U B ^ l ^ $ B & i l ^ 
• 
Describe vehicle: 2 0 b 4 S\\\)iV fq><g\j 
b. Other (specify): 
Other Orders (List below)-
. ^ g g ^ ^ a ^ v 
^W^ ^ 
Judge's Signature 
I CERTIFY THAT THIS 
AN ORIGINAL DOCUME 
THIRD DISTRICT CO 
COUNTY STATE OF UTAH 
DATE ^^\O-0q 
Respondent's Waiver of Notice 
I received a copy of this Civil Stalking Injunction, and waive my right to be personally served with the order. 
Respondent's Address: 
Street City State Zip 
Respondent's Signature: i 
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employer, coworker, friend, or associate of the person; 
(E) places an object on or delivers an object to property owned, leased, 
or occupied by a person, or to the person's place of employment 
with the intent that the object be delivered to the person; or 
(F) uses a computer, the Internet, text messaging, or any other 
electronic means to commit an act that is a part of the course of 
conduct. 
(c) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person 
who regularly resides in the household or who regularly resided in the 
household within the prior six months. 
(d) "Emotional distress" means significant mental or psychological suffering, 
whether or not medical or other professional treatment or counseling is 
required. 
(e) "Reasonable person" means a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. 
(f) "Stalking" means an offense as described in Subsection (2) or (3). 
(g) "Text messaging" means a communication in the form of electronic text or one 
or more electronic images sent by the actor from a telephone or computer to 
another person's telephone or computer by addressing the communication to 
the recipient's telephone number. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of 
conduct directed at a specific person and knows or should know that the course of 
conduct would cause a reasonable person: 
(a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or 
(b) to suffer other emotional distress. 
(3) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates: 
(a) a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 11, Chapter 3a, Stalking 
Injunctions; or 
(b) a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section. 
(4) In any prosecution under this section, it is not a defense that the actor: 
(a) was not given actual notice that the course of conduct was unwanted; or 
(b) did not intend to cause the victim fear or other emotional distress. 
(5) An offense of stalking may be prosecuted under this section in any jurisdiction 
where one or more of the acts that is part of the course of conduct was initiated or 
caused an effect on the victim. 
(6) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor: 
(a) upon the offender's first violation of Subsection (2); or 
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 11, Chapter 
3a, Stalking Injunctions. 
(7) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender: 
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is 
substantially similar to the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any crime in 
another jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in which the 
victim of the stalking offense or a member of the victim's immediate family was 
also a victim of the previous felony offense; 
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to Subsection 
(9); or 
(e) has been or is at the time of the offense a cohabitant, as defined in Section 78B-7-
102, of the victim. 
(8) Stalking is a second degree felony if the offender: 
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used other means or 
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, in the commission of the 
crime of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions of 
offenses that are substantially similar to the offense of stalking; 
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of offenses under 
Subsection (7) (a), (b), or (c); 
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in Utah or 
of crimes in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, 
would be felonies, in which the victim of the stalking was also a victim of the 
previous felony offenses; or 
(f) has been previously convicted of an offense under Subsection (7) (d), (e), or (f). 
(9) (a) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in abeyance for 
a period of time serves as an application for a permanent criminal stalking injunction 
limiting the contact between the defendant and the victim. 
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued by the court without a 
hearing unless the defendant requests a hearing at the time of the conviction. 
The court shall give the defendant notice of the right to request a hearing. 
(c) If the defendant requests a hearing under Subsection (9)(b), it shall be held at 
the time of the conviction unless the victim requests otherwise, or for good 
cause. 
(d) If the conviction was entered in a justice court, a certified copy of the judgment 
and conviction or a certified copy of the court's order holding the plea in 
abeyance must be filed by the victim in the district court as an application and 
request for a hearing for a permanent criminal stalking injunction. 
(10) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the following relief: 
(a) an order: 
(i) restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or 
place of employment of the victim; and 
(ii) requiring the defendant to stay away from the victim and members of the 
victim's immediate family or household and to stay away from any 
specified place that is named in the order and is frequented regularly by 
the victim; and 
(b) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with or regarding the 
victim, including an order forbidding the defendant from personally or through 
an agent initiating any communication likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the 
victim, including personal, written, or telephone contact with or regarding the 
victim, with the victim's employers, employees, coworkers, friends, associates, 
or others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or 
alarm to the victim. 
(11) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved or dismissed only upon 
application of the victim to the court which granted the injunction. 
(12) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to this section 
shall be sent by the court to the statewide warrants network or similar system. 
(13) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section has effect 
statewide. 
(14) (a) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section constitutes a third 
degree felony offense of stalking under Subsection (7). 
(b) Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, a 
criminal action initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both. 
(15) This section does not preclude the filing of a criminal information for stalking 
based on the same act which is the basis for the violation of the stalking injunction 
issued pursuant to Title 11, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions, or a permanent criminal 
stalking injunction. 
Amended by Chapter 199,1988 General Session 
